Ideas from 'Against Structural Universals' by David Lewis [1986], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' by Lewis,David [CUP 1999,0-521-58787-5]].
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
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15435
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If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
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15451
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I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
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15433
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Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
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15436
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Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
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15438
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We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
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15448
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The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts
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15449
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If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals
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15439
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The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts
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15441
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The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over
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15445
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Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures
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15434
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Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts
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15437
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We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
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15446
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Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
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15440
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A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology
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15444
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Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
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15450
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Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
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15443
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Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one
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